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THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976: FIRST STEP
TOWARD IMPROVED MANAGEMENT OF
MARINE FISHERIES
Warren G. Magnuson*
I. INTRODUCTION
After two years of active debate, the Congress of the United States
enacted the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
(FCMA)' to extend national fishery management jurisdiction to 200
nautical miles. During consideration of the bills that proposed this
new limit, Congress conducted nearly three weeks of public hearings,
involving five separate committees of the House and Senate. Despite
strong opposition by the executive branch, led by the Law of the Sea
Office of the National Security Council, President Ford signed the leg-
islation into law on April 13, 1976. On March 1, 1977, fishery law
enforcement officials began to enforce the provisions of the Act.
This legislation is significant for two reasons: (1) It establishes, for
the first time, comprehensive management of the fisheries of the
United States; and (2) it has played a key role in establishing a new
customary rule of international law in a relatively short period of time
and without major confrontation between nations. As of this writing,
every fishing nation that operates a fleet within 200 miles of United
States shores has signed a governing international fishery agreement
with the United States. Transition to the new regime has been accom-
plished in an orderly fashion. Nevertheless, the legislation is new and
complex. Any new law requires a "shakedown" period, and the
FCMA will be no exception. Yet the tools for truly effective nianage-
ment are there. I am proud to have participated in the drafting of this
landmark measure.
The purpose of this article is to discuss three things: First, the back-
ground which led to the passage of the Act is briefly outlined; second,
* United States Senator from the State of Washington.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882
(West Supp. 1977)). H.R. 200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), passed the House by a
vote of 208 to 101 on October 9, 1975, and passed the Senate in lieu of S. 961, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1975), on January 28, 1976.
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the content of the Act is described; and finally, I discuss the significant
elements of the debate on the bill, mainly those relating to United
States foreign policy.
II. BACKGROUND
The greatness of nations is founded on abundant natural resources.
The endurance of great nations depends upon how wisely they
manage those resources. Nonrenewable resources-ores, metals, fossil
fuels, and uranium-are finite, consumable, and will be depleted over
time, even with the most erudite management; however, the renewable
natural resources-forests, fisheries, and agriculture-can be man-
aged in perpetuity within the limits of the skill, knowledge, and self-
restraint of the user.
If the United States is to maintain world prominence, we must learn
to manage our dwindling resources more wisely. This nation faces, in
the 1980's and beyond, an era of ever-growing scarcity that will affect
the very style and quality of American life. Domestic and foreign
policy will inevitably change as our indigenous resources are depleted
and we become more dependent on foreign countries for energy, me-
tals, and minerals. To what extent our economic strength and world
leadership will decline depends upon how skillfully we can allocate
and manage our domestic resources while supplementing our needs
with foreign resources.
The analogies I have drawn between the management of land-based
resources and the living resources of the sea are limited, however, by
the nature of the resources themselves. It is infinitely more difficult to
manage mobile, migratory, common property fishery stocks whose
habitats are in both domestic and international waters than it is to
manage forests or crops subject to a clear and well-established legal
regime. The demise of the United States fisheries in the past is more
accurately attributable to nonmanagement rather than to misman-
agement.
United States fishing interests began to be heard in the Congress by
the middle of the 1930's. In 1937 bills were introduced in both
Houses of the Congress that would have excluded foreign fishermen
from taking salmon from the waters over the Alaskan continental
shelf.2 These bills proposed a drastic departure from international law
2. H.R. 8344, S. 3744, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937).
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from the standpoint of both the ownership of the anadromous fish and
the seaward extension of sovereign jurisdiction, because the legislation
would have extended jurisdiction over half of the Bering Sea east of
the international boundary and would have created a line of demarca-
tion 400 miles from the Alaskan mainland. Although a watered-down
version of the bills was passed by the Senate in 1937, no further ac-
tion was subsequently taken by the Congress.
After World War II the oil and fishing interests joined forces to call
attention to the significance of the resources of the Continental Shelf
and its superjacent waters. The debate culminated in 1945 with the
issuance of the so-called Truman Proclamations, which unilaterally
set out a declaration of jurisdiction over the Continental Shelf and
created a fisheries conservation zone-a contiguous zone of unspeci-
fied extent.3 The first proclamation, Policy of the United States with
Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas,4 was
made in response to a problem that had been under consideration
since 1937: Japanese fishing of salmon off the Alaskan coast but out-
side the United States territorial sea limits. This stock had been devel-
oped and maintained by United States nationals and was in danger of
being depleted by foreign fishermen. The proclamation laid down
three principles: (1) That the United States may establish conservation
zones on the high seas for the purpose of protecting its coastal fish-
eries from overfishing; (2) that where only American fishermen are
concerned, the United States may do this unilaterally; where fish-
ermen of other nations are also concerned, the United States may do
this in conjunction with such other nations; and (3) that the United
States recognized the right of other nations to take similar steps to
protect their coastal fisheries. Most American authorities interpreted
this proclamation as a narrowly constructed statement that would in-
form other countries of the need to initiate negotiations with the
United States when their nationals engaged in extensive fishing activi-
ties in the high seas off United States coasts. The purpose of such ne-
gotiations was to encourage joint cooperation for the conservation of
the resource. The proclamation was not an extension of sovereignty
over areas of the high seas, nor was it intended as a notice that off-
3. See Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation); Procla-
mation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-1948 Compilation).
4. Proclamation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-1948 Compilation).
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shore high seas would be closed to foreign fishermen. 5 Its success in
motivating negotiations is suggested by the fact that it was never im-
plemented. 6 The proclamation, however, was viewed by some foreign
countries as justification for unilateral extensions.
The second proclamation, Policy of the United States with Respect
to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Conti-
nental Shelf,7 asserted the jurisdiction and control of the United States
over the mineral resources of the Continental Shelf. The 1958 United
Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf later set into treaty law
the principles that had been expressed in the Truman Proclamation
thirteen years earlier.
The Truman Proclamations, whatever their net effect in terms of
international relations, established a basis for customary international
law to evolve through the extension of coastal jurisdiction seaward for
the conservation of fisheries and preservation of exclusive fishing
rights for the coastal states. Just as they would later react to the 200-
mile fishery conservation zone established by the 1976 Act, "strict
construction" internationalists objected in earnest to the alleged de-
parture of the United States from "international law" in the form of
the Truman Proclamations.
In 1958 and 1960, consensus concerning the permissible limits of
fishery jurisdiction eluded the participants in the United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva. In fact, the 1960 ses-
sion focused on the fishery limit question and the limit of the terri-
torial sea. Thus, the United States three-mile territorial sea served
until 1966. In 1966 the United States established a fisheries zone of
nine miles contiguous to the territorial sea of three miles; within this
zone the United States exercised the same exclusive rights with re-
spect to fisheries as it had in its territorial sea, subject, however, to the
continuation of traditional fishing by foreign states as might be recog-
nized by the United States. 8 During Senate hearings the Department
of State had no objection from the standpoint of foreign relations to
establishing a twelve-mile exclusive fisheries zone. The Legal Adviser
noted that, in view of recent developments in international practice,
5. H. REIFF, THE UNITED STATES AND THE TREATY LAW OF THE SEA 306 (1959).
6. 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 961 (1965).
7. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation).
8. Bartlett Act. Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908 (1966). For a discussion of the
Bartlett Act, see Fidell, Ten Years Under the Bartlett Act: A Status Report on the
Prohibition on Foreign Fishing, 54 B.U.L. REV. 703 (1974).
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action by the United States would not be contrary to international
law.
Nevertheless, failure of the contiguous zone as a rational unit for
managing coastal fisheries has been amply demonstrated and is mani-
fested by the fact that thirty-four countries have abandoned it in favor
of conservation zones ranging from 70 to 200 nautical miles seaward. 9
The developing concept of an "economic zone" being debated at the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is providing
additional momentum to the international movement toward broader
resource management zones. At this time, it represents one of the few
generally accepted provisions of the Single Negotiating Text devel-
oped by the Conference.
A short description of the fisheries off the United States coast and
the fishing industry is also necessary to permit a fuller understanding
of the new legislation. Although the total annual world landings of fish
(edible and nonedible) have tripled since 1938, from approximately
50 billion pounds to over 150 billion pounds, United States landings
have increased only from 4.3 to 4.7 billion pounds from 1938 to
1973. But the volume of fish caught off the shores of the United States
has also tripled-approximately 4.4 billion pounds were harvested in
1948, compared to 11.8 billion pounds in 1973. Because United
States vessel landings remained relatively static during this twenty-five
year period, the increase is attributable tb the efforts of foreign
fishing. Foreign vessels take nearly seventy percent of the commercial
catch of United States coastal fisheries.
As has been the case with total landings, United States consumption
has also increased during this period, although slightly less dramati-
cally. The United States more than doubled its consumption of fish
products from approximately 3.1 billion pounds in 1948 to 7 billion
pounds in 1973. Yet the importance of these statistics lies in the fact
that since the United States catch has remained relatively constant, the
difference represents imported fish, much of which has been taken
from waters adjacent to the United States. This has had a significant
impact on the United States balance-of-trade deficit, not to mention
the economic damage to United States fisheries.
The fact that almost seventy percent of the fish caught off the
coasts of the United States is taken by foreign fishermen is not in and
9. Office of the Geographer, U.S. Dep't of State, National Maritime Claims
(Jan. 13, 1977) (memorandum).
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of itself the most disturbing factor. Rather, it is the fact that foreign
fishermen are highly efficient and mobile and can move to other parts
of the world if they overfish United States waters. With the use of
huge factory vessels and large fleets of smaller fishing boats that de-
liver their catch to the processing vessels, the foreigners have been vir-
tually vacuuming the seas of precious life and economic value. At the
time of the congressional debate, sixteen species of fish were judged by
United States scientists to be overfished off our shores. Although not
all of the overfishing can be blamed on foreign efforts, the majority
can be. If a coastal nation does not take action to protect the fishery
resources near its shore, then no one will. And someone must, or the
ramifications of such overfishing will have profound impacts on all of
mankind and on our citizens whose livelihoods depend on fishing.
III. THE DECISION TO EXTEND JURISDICTION
The United States approach to marine fishery management in the
past may be considered haphazard at best. Our federal fishery man-
agement legislation resembled a crazy patchwork quilt of pieced-to-
gether remnants. Generally its basis was not in resource information,
landing statistics, and data, but in weak divided authority and inade-
quate enforcement among complex jurisdictions. The authorizing leg-
islation itself was merely a collection of single purpose statutes and
international agreements loosely coupled through the commonality of
fisheries. 10 In reality the states, by virtue of federal inaction and the
authority given them by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,11 were
the only government units with comprehensive fishery management
authority.
More than a decade prior to passage of the Submerged Lands Act,
the United States Supreme Court in Skiriotes v. Florida12 made clear
that a state may regulate activities of its own citizens with respect to a
fishery on the high seas when the state has a legitimate interest in the
10. This legislation included the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Act of 1950. Tuna
Conventions Act of 1950, Bartlett Act, and the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's
Protective Act.
11. 43U.S.C.§ 1311 (1970).
12. 313U.S.69(1941).
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fishery and there is no conflicting federal law.1 3 Until enactment of the
1976 Act, the federal government did no more than act as caretaker
or custodian of the waters of the contiguous zone and as a research
backup to state conservation efforts. At the same time, our interna-
tional agreements were doing little to help conserve the fishery stocks
on the high seas.14
It was with this historical background and the realization that the
Law of the Sea negotiations were inextricably bogged down in the
debate over the future of seabed mining that the 94th Congress took
action. Thirty-six bills were introduced for the purpose of conserving
and managing fish stocks. These proposals can be classified into the
following seven general approaches:1 5 (1) Single interim extension of
jurisdiction to 200 miles with control over anadromous fish (H.R.
200); (2) extension of jurisdiction to 200 miles, control over anad-
romous species, regulation by regional councils, and federal support
and final approval authority (S. 961); (3) extension of jurisdiction to
200 miles, control over anadromous species, regulation by regional
councils, and federal management and enforcement (H.R. 9840); (4)
establishment of a fishing zone to conform with article 7 of the Con-
vention on Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas
(H.R. 1070); (5) extension of fisheries jurisdiction to the edge of the
Continental Shelf (H.R. 2173); (6) a fisheries management program
regulated by regional councils without extension of jurisdiction (H.R.
8265); and (7) an embargo on fish imports from countries violating
the waters of the contiguous zone (H.R. 80). The Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act of 1976 is an amalgam of several of the
approaches suggested by the various bills.
There are two broad purposes of the FCMA: (1) To extend the ju-
risdiction of the United States for the purpose of regulating the marine
13. Prior to the enactment of the FCMA, the Alaska Supreme Court in a con-
troversial decision held that that state could regulate both resident and nonresident
fishermen in the Bering Sea when the state had a sufficient interest in the fishery.
State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530 (Alas. 1976), appeal dismissed sub nom. Uri v.
Alaska, 97 S. Ct. 40 (1977).
14. For example, the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fish-
eries (ICNAF) annually allowed quotas, which caused stocks of cod, yellowtail
flounder, and herring on Georges Bank to be steadily depleted. Under the ICNAF
provisions, regulations were weak and enforcement often nonexistent. With a few
exceptions, most other treaties were similarly ineffective.
15. Only representative bills introduced in the first session of the 94th Congress
are listed. Numerous identical or similar bills were introduced in the 93d and 94th
Congresses.
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fisheries to the newly created fishery conservation zone which ad-
joins the territorial sea (three-mile limit) and extends seaward out to
200 nautical miles from the coast, and (2) to impose a management
regime within the fishery conservation zone to be administered by
Regional Fishery Management Councils and the Department of
Commerce. Extension of sovereign jurisdiction, coupled with a com-
prehensive resource management scheme, was in response to what the
resource managers saw as a tripartite requirement for wise utilization
of fish stocks-management planning, regulation, and enforcement.1 6
The Act is organized in four titles: Title I states the authority of the
United States for fishery management; Title II specifies the relation-
ship between the administration of the domestic legislation and for-
eign fishing within the fishery conservation zone; Title III estab-
lishes a system for developing regional fishery management plans for
the purpose of providing a framework for control, regulation, and
enforcement; and Title IV contains conforming amendments and in-
cremental changes to existing related laws to make them consistent
with the intent of the Act.
Title I establishes the fishery conservation zone (FCZ), which
extends seaward from the coast to a distance of 200 nautical miles. 17
The integrity of state control over the fisheries within the territorial
sea of three nautical miles is in no way altered.18 Within the FCZ the
United States will exercise exclusive fishery management authority
over all fish' 9 with the exception of "highly migratory species," 20 de-
fined in the Act as tuna. 21 The Act also authorizes the management of
anadromous species that spawn in United States waters throughout
their migratory range, except when such species are in another na-
tion's jurisdictional waters, as recognized by the United States.22 Sed-
entary species (for example, coral, crab, lobster, clams, abalone, and
sponges) found on the Continental Shelf beyond the 200-mile zone are
16. See Hearings on S. 961 Before the Senate Comn. on Commerce, 94th Cong..
lst Sess., ser. 94-27, pt. 1, at 33 (1975) (testimony of David Wallace).
17. Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) § 101, 16 U.S.C.A. §
1811 (West Supp. 1977).
18. Id. § 306, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856.
19. Id.§ 102, 16U.S.C.A. § 1812.
20. Id.§ 103, 16U.S.C.A. § 1813.
21. Id. § 3(14), 16U.S.C.A. § 1802(14).
22. Id. § 102(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1812(2).
434
Vol. 52: 427, 1977
A Legislator's Perspective
also within the jurisdiction of the United States and are defined as
continental shelf fishery resources.23
While part of the impetus for enacting the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976 was the desire to control foreign access
to the United States coastal fishery, it was recognized that it was nei-
ther practical nor desirable to exclude all foreign fishing from the
fishery conservation zone. Emphasis was on conservation and man-
agement, not on exclusion. Title II authorizes foreign fishing within
the FCZ if (1) a treaty or international fishery agreement is currently
in force (such fishing may continue until the instrument expires or is
renegotiated),2 4 or (2) the country enters into a governing interna-
tional fishery agreement (GIFA) with the United States.25 In either
event, each foreign vessel must be issued a permit annually by the Sec-
retary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Commerce. 26
"Reasonable" nondiscriminatory license fees may be charged foreign
vessels and are to be based upon the costs of management, research,
administration, enforcement, and other factors relating to the conser-
vation and management of the fishery.27
Foreign fishermen, however, will be permitted to take only that
portion of the "optimum yield"28 not harvested by United States fish-
ermen.29 In other words, preference is given to American fishermen in
allocating the portion of the stocks that may be harvested annually.
The determination of optimum yield and its allocation will be part of
23. Id. §§ 3(4), 102(3), 16U.S.C.A. §§ 1802(4), 1812(3).
24. Id. § 20 1(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(b).
25. Id. '§ 20i(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c); For a discussion of Congress role in
these agreements, see Note, Congressional Authorization and Oversight of International
Fishery Agreements Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,
52 WASH. L. REv. 495 (1977).
26. Id. § 201(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a).
27. Id. § 204(b)(10), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(10). For a discussion of fees and
access controls under the FCMA, see Anderson & Wilson, Economic Dimensions of
Fees and Access Control Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 701 (1977); Burke, Recapture of Economic Rent Under the
FCMA: Sections 303-304 on Permits and Fees, 52 WASH. L. REv. 681 (1977); Christy,
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: Management Objectives
and the Distribution of Benefits and Costs, 52 WASH. L. REV. 657 (1977).
28. Optimum yield is defined in the Act as that part of a fishery that will provide
"the greatest overall benefit to the nation, with particular reference to food production
and recreational opportunities .... " FCMA § 3(18)(A), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(18)(A)
(West Supp. 1977). In arriving at optimum yield, a variety of economic, social, eco-
logical, and biological factors are taken into account. Id. § 3(18), 16 U.S.C.A. §
1802(18).
29. Id. § 303(a)(4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a)(4).
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the responsibilities of the Regional Fishery Management Councils es-
tablished in Title 111. 30
The Regional Fishery Management Councils provide the frame-
work for management and conservation under the Act. The Councils
are unique among institutions that manage natural resources. They
are neither state nor federal in character, although they possess quali-
ties of each. Their powers are derived from the constitutional au-
thority of the federal government, yet the Councils are self-determi-
nant in their own affairs. Enforcement and administration of the
Councils' plans and regulations are carried out by the responsible fed-
eral agencies.
Title III enumerates the duties of the Regional Management Coun-
cils to be as follows: (1) To develop and amend fishery management
plans; (2) to submit periodic reports to the Secretary of Commerce;
(3) to review and revise assessments of optimum yield and fishing al-
lowances to foreign licensees; (4) to encourage public participation,
through hearings, in the development of fishery management plans
and the administration of the Act; (5) to establish scientific and statis-
tical committees and advisory panels; and (6) to undertake other activ-
ities necessary for carrying out the Act.3 '
Although the Councils are to be relatively independent, each
Council must operate within the uniform standards promulgated by
the Secretary of Commerce that govern the administration of the Act.
The principal function of the Councils is to formulate fishery manage-
ment plans upon which management and conservation regulations are
30. Id. § 303(a)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a)(3). The Act creates eight Councils.
as follows: New England, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, Caribbean. Gulf, Pacific.
North Pacific, and Western Pacific, Id. § 302(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(a). The Coun-
cils are composed of a variable number of members, depending on the regions and
the number of states involved. In general, however, the following members are
designated by the Act: (1) The principal state official with responsibility for marine
fishery management from each state in the region; (2) the regional director of the
National Marine Fisheries Service; (3) one "qualified" person per state to be nom-
inated by the Governor and selected by the Secretary of Commerce; and (4) addi-
tional "qualified individuals" to be appointed at large by the Secretary of Commerce
from nominations by the Governor, the number of which depends on the number
of states that are members of the Council. Id. § 302(b). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(b). Ex
officio nonvoting members include the regional or area director of the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service, the Commander of the United States Coast Guard dis-
trict, the executive director of any existing appropriate Marine Fisheries Commission.
and a representative of the Department of State. Id. § 302(c), 16 U.S.C.A. §
1852(c).
31. Id. § 302(g)-(h), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(g)-(h).
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to be based. Such plans are to be developed in accordance with the
following national standards:
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent over-
fishing while achieving. . . the optimum yield from each fishery.
(2) Conservation and management measures shall be based upon
the best scientific information available.
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be
managed as a unit throughout its range ....
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate
between residents of different states ...
(5) Conservation and management measures shall, where practica-
ble, promote efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources ....
(6) Conservation and management measures shall take into account
, the variations among . . . fisheries, fishery resources, and
catches.
(7) Conservation and management measures shall . . . minimize
costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.32
The plans must contain provisions to govern both foreign and do-
mestic fishing, a description of the fishery, an assessment of present
and probable future conditions of the fishery (including both max-
imum sustainable yield and optimum yield), and an assessment of the
extent to which the optimum yield will be harvested and the portion of
the optimum yield that can be made available to foreign fishermen. 33
The plans may contain optional provisions such as requirements for
permits and fees; designation of zones and fishing periods; limits on
catch based on size, area, or weight; and a system of limited access. 34
While the Regional Council may prepare and submit to the Secretary
of Commerce proposed regulations that would implement the man-
agement plans,35 it is the Secretary who must promulgate and imple-
ment the regulations.3 6 Management plans must be submitted to the
Secretary, who has sixty days to review them and notify the Council
of his or her approval, disapproval, or partial disapproval.37 Any dis-
approval must be accompanied by a statement of reasons therefor
32. Id. § 301, 16U.S.C.A. § 1851.
33. Id. § 303(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a).
34. Id. § 303(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b).
35. Id. § 303(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(c).
36. Id. § 305(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(a).
37. Id. § 3 04(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(a).
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and suggestions for improvement. 38 The plan is subsequently pub-
lished in the Federal Register, and after hearings and prescribed ad-
ministrative actions, the plan goes into effect.39 The regulations are
enforced by the United States Coast Guard in conjunction with the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Marine
Fisheries Service. 40 Both civil and criminal penalties are provided for
in the Act, with possibility of forfeiture of vessel, gear, and catch.41
Title IV of the Act provides authority to revise the regulations to
conform to any agreement that may be reached as a result of the
Third Law of the Sea Conference, thereby making the Act an interim
measure until an acceptable comprehensive international agreement is
reached. 42 In addition, inconsistent provisions of other legislation
have been revised to conform to the intent of the new Act. Section
403 amends the Fishermen's Protective Act to make the provisions of
that Act conform with the recognition of the United States unilateral
extension of its fishery jurisdiction. Similarly, the Title amends the
Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Atlantic Tunas Convention
Act to extend these laws to the fishery conservation zone.43
IV. DEBATE OVER THE PROPOSED EXTENSION
In my view, this legislation presented a classic confrontation be-
tween the executive and legislative branches of our government in the
area of foreign affairs. Each branch sought to carry out its particular
constitutional mandate. Yet the struggle between Congress and the
Executive over foreign policymaking has received little note in either
38. Id.
39. Id. § 305(a)-(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(a)-(c). For an analysis of judicial
review of management regulations under the FCMA, see Comment, Judicial Review
of Fishery Management Regulations Under the Fishery Conservation and Manage-
mnent Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 599 (1977).
40. For an extensive discussion of enforcement of the new legislation, see Fidell.
Enforcement of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: The Police-
man's Lot, 52 WASH. L. REV. 513 (1977).
41. SeeFCMA §§ 308-310. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1858-1860 (West Supp. 1977).
42. Id. § 401, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1881. For an analysis of potential differences
between the FCMA and the proposed treaty text of the United Nations Law of the
Sea Conference and their possible resolution, see Jacobson & Cameron. Potential
Conflicts Between a Future Law of the Sea Treaty and the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 451 (1977).
43. FCMA §§ 404-405.
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newspaper or scholarly discussions. I believe it is instructive, there-
fore, to review the debate over the Act and analyze the prognostica-
tions and concerns of both sides.
It is also important to view this new law in the context of interna-
tional law. As will be obvious, discussion of the international legality
of the law occupied a significant portion of the legislative branch's
time. It raised some very basic questions, with no easy or 'clear an-
swers: What is international law? How can international law be made
responsive, in a timely fashion, to the real problems of the day? What
is the difference between law and policy? The debate was not really
about a problem. Everyone conceded that a problem existed. It was
about the proper solution to the problem. The Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976 was, to say the least, a controversial
topic in the 94th Congress. The debate engendered by this proposal
was skillfully and eloquently presented by my distinguished colleagues
on both sides of the issue. The measure was addressed in the Senate
alone for the better part of nine days, and in that time the positions of
those for and against the legislation were fully and openly discussed.
It is clear, however, that some people still do not understand the rea-
sons behind the measure or that it was a proper exercise of our right
to protect the vital interests of the United States; that is, the right to
prevent United States fishery resources from becoming irretrievably
depleted.
The bills, S. 961 and H.R. 200, were erroneously referred to by
some as the "200-mile fishery bills." Although certainly they did in-
clude a fishery conservation zone seaward of the United States for a
distance of 200 miles, I believe such a title places the emphasis of the
law in the wrong place. The legislation does not stake out a portion of
the seas for the exclusive use of the United States. Rather the main
thrust of the legislation is to provide a mechanism and program of
conservation and management in order to save and revitalize the valu-
able fishery resources adjacent to our shores. Time was running out
on many vital stocks. This was clear to anyone who understood the
situation, and, in fact, this point was not a major contention in the
Congress of the United States. Few would question the fact that ex-
isting international agreements or treaties, both of the bilateral and
multilateral nature, had been almost totally ineffective in preventing
further destruction of the fishing industry and the fishery resources
themselves. The real debate was over how best to create a fishery
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management regime-unilaterally or through international agree-
ment.
Although coastal fishing interests favored adoption of an extended
fishing zone, the legislation was opposed by the Administration, the
distant water tuna and shrimp fishermen, and some members of Con-
gress. Throughout the congressional development and consideration
of the Act, opponents of the legislation emphasized its international
implications and impact. Their arguments included the following-
that extension by the United States:
-would breed extensions by other countries which would be retalia-
tory in nature and which might be broader than a fisheries jurisdic-
tion;
-would adversely affect relations with nations fishing off United
States shores;
-would seriously damage United States distant water fishing inter-
ests, both in the short run and in the Law of the Sea Conference
negotiations;
-would be unenforceable;
-would not be compatible with existing international law;
-would undercut United States efforts toward a comprehensive Law
of the Sea Treaty and endanger successful negotiation at the Con-
ference of other United States ocean interests;
-- would contradict a fundamental United States position against uni-
lateral extensions into high seas areas and the United States posi-
tion that our interests can best be protected by international agree-
ments rather than by unilateral extensions;
-would violate United States treaty obligations.
First, let me address the question of whether this Act repudiates the
international treaty obligations of the United States. Even a cursory
reading of section 202 of the Act 44 should make it clear that the law
does not abrogate existing United States treaty obligations. Rather it
requires that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary
of Commerce, review existing treaties, conventions, and agreements to
determine if such international obligations are consistent with the re-
quirements and provisions of the Act. The purpose of the review is to
determine if those obligations are consistent with the legitimate inter-
ests and obligations of the United States in protecting and conserving
44. 16U.S.C.A. § 1822 (West Supp. 1977).
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its natural resources. .Article 1.2 of the Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas45 creates in a
coastal nation a "duty to adopt" conservation measures in its coastal
waters. After reviewing the international agreements, treaties, and
conventions for consistency, the Secretary of State is directed to nego-
tiate with the appropriate nation to arrive at new treaties--or gov-
erning international fishing agreements (GIFA's)-that will ensure the
conservation and management practices mandated by the law. Again,
there is no reference to the fact that international agreements will be
repealed. Presumably, other nations will agree with the international
recognition that conservation of the living resources of the sea is a de-
sirable and necessary goal. The United States has two options, how-
ever, if other nations do not agree with suggested conforming changes
to existing treaties: Either it may withdraw from any treaty pursuant to
provisions in all treaties for termination, or the executive branch may
submit a new treaty to Congress for approval if variation from the Act
is desired and supported by those concerned.
Thus, even though preferential treatment will be given to American
fishermen, foreign fishermen will be permitted to fish within the con-
servation zone. The United States then "has a duty" to negotiate with
foreign governments for the right of their citizens to fish off our
coasts46 with the obvious proviso that they do so within sound conser-
vation and management practices established by the Regional Coun-
cils.
Second, I do not believe that the creation of the 200-mile fishery
conservation zone violates international law-either international
agreement or custom. Put more precisely, the United States is not in-
hibited by any specific treaty language from invoking the customary
law process of claim and counterclaim as a method of lawmaking. It
is true that at the time the Act was debated less than a majority of na-
45. Apr. 29, 1958, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 13 8, T.I.A.S. No. 5969.
46. The Committee on Commerce in its report to the Senate on S. 961 clearly
emphasized this point: "It should be made clear that S. 961 does not automatically
and completely negate either existing treaty rights or traditional fishing activity.
Clearly, the United States has a duty to negotiate with those countries whose citizens
fish in areas which would come under an extended fishery conservation zone." S. REP.
No. 94-416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1975) (emphasis added), reprinted in SENATh
COMM. ON COMMERCE & NAT'L OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976,
at 653, 682 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
441
Washington Law Review
tions had formally claimed a 200-mile limit. But a sizable and
growing number had, and no limit had been agreed upon in a treaty.
The 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea are often
cited as proving that the Act violates international agreements to
which we are a signatory. Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention of the
High Seas47 are often cited as creating a binding rule of international
law which restrains a coastal nation from extending its fishery jurisdic-
tion. It is argued that the area beyond three miles (or territorial sea) is
high seas and that no coastal nation may inhibit any freedom of the
high seas, including freedom of fishing. Because the United States
claims and recognizes a territorial sea of only three miles, the logical
extension of this argument is that the United States twelve-mile fishery
zone under the Bartlett Act 48 was also illegal. This view, however,
fails to recognize developing international law.
The International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case49 pointed out that "the extension of that fishery zone up to a 12-
mile limit from the base lines appears now to be generally accepted." 50
The court also noted that the 1958 United Nations Conference
"failed to reach agreement either on the limit of the territorial sea or
on the zone of exclusive fisheries."51 Therefore, it makes little sense to
argue that any of the 1958 Conventions establishes a fishery zone of
either three or twelve miles. Because the twelve-mile limit developed
since 1958 through the customary law process, there is no definitive
prohibition in the 1958 Convention against further extensions.
The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas52 provides a procedure authorizing unilateral
47. Apr. 29, 1958, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200. These articles provide as
follows:
Article I
The term "high seas" means all parts of the sea that are not included in the
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State.
Article 2
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject
any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under
the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international
law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing ....
48. Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908 (1966).
49. United Kingdom v. Iceland (Fisheries Jurisdiction), [ 1974] I.CJ. 3.
50. Id. at 24. See also S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975). re-
printed in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, su pra note 46, at 653, 662.
51. [1974] I.C.J. at 13.
52. Apr. 29, 1958. [1966] 17 U.S.T. 138. T.I.A.S. No. 5969.
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action by the United States to protect or conserve the fishery resources
off its shores.53 Opponents of the Act said that the United States may
take unilateral measures to protect fishery resources, but only through
the procedure prescribed by that treaty-that is, after six months of
negotiations with affected nations. Unfortunately this argument com-
pletely ignored the fact that the major fishing effort off our shores was
being conducted by countries, such as the Soviet Union, Japan, Po-
land, East Germany, and Korea, that are neither signatories to nor
bound by that treaty. Therefore, it would be futile to proceed under
the Convention.
While the 1958 Convention on Fishing is toothless, it nonetheless
establishes a precedent for the kind of -unilateral action called for in
the Fishery Conservation and Management Act. In article 1.2, that
Convention states: "All States have the duty to adopt or to cooperate
with other States in adopting, such measures for their respective na-
tionals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living re-
sources of the high seas."'54 Thus, the United States not only has a
right and responsibility under the Convention to take conservation'
measures to protect the living resources offshore; it has a duty to do
so. The Convention addresses the situation in which two or more
countries are fishing in the same area in article 4.1:
If the nationals of two or more States are engaged in fishing the
same stock or stocks of fish or other living marine resources in any
area or areas of the high seas, these States shall, at the request of any
of them, enter into negotiations with a view to prescribing by agree-
ment for their nationals the necessary measures for the conservation of
the living resources affected.55
The FCMA does exactly that, but without a six-month delay. It di-
rects the Secretary of State to undertake negotiations with the repre-
sentatives of countries that, by treaty or tradition, fish adjacent to the
53. The procedure is set out in article 7 of the Convention, which states:
Having regard to the provisions of paragraph I of article 6 [coastal State has
special interest in maintenance of adjacent living resources], any coastal State
may, with a view to the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources
of the sea, adopt unilateral measures of conservation appropriate to any stock of
fish or other marine resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its terri-
torial sea, provided that negotiations to that effect with the other States concerned
have not led to an agreement within six months.
54. (Emphasis added).
55. (Emphasis added).
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United States, with the goal of reaching agreements for the conserva-
tion of the resources. The important point is that the very passage of
the Act was, if not an invitation itself, an authorization for the Admin-
istration to "request" other nations to enter into negotiations. Such
requests were made shortly after the passage of the Act. As of March
1, 1977 (more than ten months after enactment), all nations fishing
off the United States shores had entered into governing international
fishery agreements (GIFA's) with the United States.
Those opposed to the legislation pointed out that as the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case had declared
Iceland's fifty-mile extension of its fishery zone invalid under interna-
tional law,5 6 it would have no difficulty finding a 200-mile fishery
zone of the United States illegal as well. This argument is unsound
because not only is the international law rapidly evolving, but the
United States zone is a conservation measure and, unlike Iceland's, is
not exclusive. Moreover, Iceland had signed agreements with Great
Britain and West Germany which it had ignored. For the purposes of
conserving and managing the living resources of the sea, the FCMA
invites other nations to enter into new agreements to assure that both
United States and foreign fishermen follow sound conservation prac-
tices so that these depletable resources are not destroyed. The Fish-
eries Jurisdiction Case is simply not applicable to our law.
Two additional points need to be emphasized. The first was
touched on earlier and deals with the fact that at least sixteen stocks
of fish have been over-exploited and seriously damaged. The other
point involves the matter of whether international agreements have
protected offshore stocks, thereby making the United States legislation
unnecessary. In my view, international agreements have been largely
ineffective in the conservation of the sea's living resources. One need
only look at the effectiveness-or rather the lack of effectiveness-of
the International Convention of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
(ICNAF) to conclude that existing agreements do not conserve fish
stocks.
ICNAF was established in a fishing area off the Northwest Atlantic
-off New England, Georges Bank, and Grand Banks-when it was
still one of the richest and most prolific in the world. What has taken
56. [1974] I.C.J. 3.
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place since then has been devastating. With the influx of large sophis-
ticated Russian fleets, the area has become overfished. The nations in
ICNAF did not take firm action to protect haddock until the stocks
were dwindling rapidly. By then action taken was so late that all that
could be done was to ban all direct fishing of haddock. But even this
action has had little effect because many nations fail to enforce this
law. In the cases of Russia and Poland, two of the major offenders,
the vessels are owned by the government. It is an inherent conflict of
interest to require these nations to police themselves. For example, the
Department of Commerce National Marine Fisheries Service, in its
investigation of Russian fleet activities, estimated that the Russians
had overfished their quota of mackerel in 1975 by 70,000 metric tons.
It is interesting that the Russians themselves, claiming a computer
error, admitted that they exceeded their mackerel quota by as much as
100,000 metric tons. Because their quota on mackerel was 101,000
metric tons, they therefore admitted overfishing by 100 percent. Such
abuses, if past practices are a guide, seemed likely to continue in the
future absent stronger enforcement. Thus, it was necessary for the
United States, as the coastal nation with the most to lose, to take ac-
tion to end this abuse of the living resources.
An additional argument against the legislation was that unilateral
action by the United States would destroy the efforts of the Third Law
of the Sea Conference (LOS III) and would lead to broader claims by
other nations. The history of the Law of the Sea negotiations is one of
limited success and no final settlement. Since LOS III began formal
sessions in 1974, the Administration has continually assured the Con-
gress that, given one more opportunity, significant progress and even a
satisfactory treaty would be forthcoming. Indeed, the preferable solu-
tion to the problem of fishery conservation would be through general
agreement at the Law of the Sea Conference; however, protection of
United States fishery resources became a matter of urgency. 57 With
the prospect of general agreement being several years in the future, it
was Congress obligation to act expeditiously.
57. As I said on the Senate floor during the deliberations on this bill: "No one
argues the point that probably the best way to do it would be to have a Law of the
Sea Conference and a treaty which we thought was feasible and workable. That
would be a better way to do it, of course. But we have waited and waited and waited
and waited." 121 CONG. REC. S23,075 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1975).
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Even with the enactment of the FCMA, it is hoped that a feasible
and workable agreement can emerge from the LOS III. This is dem-
onstrated by the interim nature of this legislation. Its provisions re-
quire that the regulations promulgated under the Act must be revised
to conform to an LOS treaty ratified by this country. 58 The Act should
work as a catalyst on the Conference. In the ten months since enact-
ment of the Act, there has been no indication that this action by the
United States has harmed the negotiations in any significant way.
Some countries have even admitted that it has aided in moving some
otherwise recalcitrant delegates.
Finally, there is no basis for the argument that this law will lead to
broader claims by other countries. There is general acceptance at the
Conference of a "200-mile economic zone." This Act creates a fishery
conservation zone only, one with less scope than an economic zone.
Its terms set no precedent justifying large territorial claims that are
not favored by the world community.
Although the opponents of the legislation argued that it would pos-
sibly lead to increased military confrontations with foreign nations,
there have been absolutely no indications that military conflicts will
result. All the nations involved in fishing adjacent to our shores have
signed GIFA's with the United States pursuant to the Act. Since these
countries have indicated their willingness to renegotiate their agree-
ments with the United States, no conflict is likely. I certainly hope that
such conflicts never develop; however, we must not shun our duty to
protect the interests of the United States. Because this legislation is is
a legitimate exercise of United States rights under international law,
speculative fears of possible military confrontations should not deter
us from our proper course. To do otherwise would be a retreat from
our basic obligations to posterity.
V. IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Act has been adopted and implementation is now under way.
Has the international impact been as negative as we were led to be-
lieve? Has the United States position in the international community
58. FCMA § 401, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1881 (West Supp. 1977). For a discussion of
the relationship between the Act and the proposed LOS treaty text. see Jacobson &
Cameron. supra note 42.
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suffered? The answer to both questions, in my opinion, is no. Rather,
time will show that this Act has contributed and will contribute posi-
tively to the development of the law of the sea.
Although it is true that during 1976 eight countries extended their
fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles and that the members of the Euro-
pean Community decided to operate after January 1, 1977, under a
similar jurisdiction vis-ht-vis nonmember countries, these extensions
cannot be attributed solely, if at all, to the United States extension.59
Like the United States, other countries have also encountered difficul-
ties in protecting their fishery resources. Furthermore, while five of the
eight extensions are part of a claimed economic zone, the countries
involved define coastal state jurisdiction within the framework of the
proposed treaty text of the Law of the Sea Conference. Thus, it would
appear that the Conference itself has assisted in generating increasing
support for and in legitimating a 200-mile economic zone, including
the extension of coastal state jurisdiction over fisheries resources.
The response to the FCMA by countries whose nationals fish off
our shores has, on the whole, been positive. 60 Governing international
fisheries agreements recognizing the United States extension and man-
agement program have been concluded and approved by the Congress
with six nations,61 and as of February 17, 1977, GIFA's had been
concluded and signed with the remaining countries involved in fishing
off United States shores.62 A reciprocal fishing agreement between the
United States and Canada has been signed and is now awaiting Senate
approval. In addition, the United States and Cuba have recently
initialed an agreement. Thus, the nations fishing off United States
shores have accepted the extension of jurisdiction and, in addition
59. Japan, having recently decided to expand its territorial limits to 12 miles, is
expected to extend its fishery jurisdiction to 200 miles in the near future. See Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 30, 1977, at A-2, col. 4.
60. The Act has had some negative impact on United States distant water fishing
interests. Bilateral negotiations, however, could improve the situation for shrimpers
and for California-based tuna fleets. An agreement with Mexico providing access
for American fishermen in Mexico's zone was signed on November 26, 1976. A treaty
with Brazil has, since 1972, provided for access by American shrimpers to Brazilian
jurisdiction. The difficulties encountered by United States tuna fleets have not been
resolved.
61. These nations are Bulgaria, Romania, Republic of China, German Democratic
Republic, USSR, and Poland.
62. These GIFA's involve the Republic of Korea, Spain, Japan, and the European
Community. The agreement with Mexico is not a GIFA because it relates to United
States fishing in the Mexican 200-mile zone.
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to entering into agreements with the United States, are also submitting
applications for permits to fish within the fisheries zone.
Although it is too early at this time to evaluate the effectiveness of
enforcement of the 200-mile extension, the Act has had the effect of
putting the United States a step ahead in preparing for and imple-
menting some of the economic zone jurisdiction envisioned by the
Law of the Sea Conference. As Rozanne L. Ridgway, the Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, observed
while addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Feb-
ruary 3, 1977:
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act has put the U.S. in
the lead in the move toward coastal state jurisdiction over fisheries.
Our Act is the first of its kind, including as it does not only the simple
extension of jurisdiction but new machinery for the exercise of that
jurisdiction. We are being closely watched by other nations as they
also move towards extended jurisdiction and expect the United States
to provide the example.
References have been made throughout this article to state practice
and the relationship between such practice and the development of
law of the sea. Professor Colombos has observed: "Custom is the most
important source of the international law of the sea and the usages of
the great maritime States must therefore always exercise a weighty
influence on its development. ' 63 In this regard, the comments by the
Canadian government in 1970, when responding to a United States
statement opposing Canadian extension of its territorial sea to twelve
miles and establishment of exclusive fisheries zones in areas of the
high seas beyond twelve miles, are particularly illustrative of United
States practice and the development of international law:
The Canadian Government cannot accept in particular the view that
international law provides no basis for the proposed measures. For
many years, large numbers of states have asserted various forms of
limited jurisdiction beyond their territorial sea over marine areas adja-
cent to their coasts. The position of the USA Government is that the
waters beyond a three-mile limit are high seas and that no state has a
right to exercise exclusive pollution or resources jurisdiction on the
high seas beyond a three-mile territorial sea. The Canadian Govern-
63. C. COLOMBos. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 7 (6th ed. 1967).
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ment does not accept this view which indeed the USA itself does not
adhere to in practice. For example, as early as 1790, at a time when
the international norm for the breadth of the territorial sea was
without question three miles, the USA claimed jurisdiction up to
twelve miles for customs purposes and enacted appropriate enforce-
ment legislation, which is still in force. Since 1935 the USA has
claimed the authority to extend customs enforcement activities as far
out to sea as 62 miles, in clear contradiction of applicable interna-
tional law. In 1966 the USA established exclusive fisheries jurisdiction
beyond its three-mile territorial sea extending out to twelve miles from
shore, and the USA has just passed analogous legislation asserting ex-
clusive pollution control jurisdiction beyond its three-mile territorial
sea and up to twelve miles ...
It is a well-established principle of international law that customary
international law is developed by state practice. Recent and important
instances of such state practice on the law of the sea are, for example;
the Truman proclamation of 1945 proclaiming USA jurisdiction over
the continental shelf and the unilateral establishment in 1966 by USA
of exclusive fishing zones. Overwhelming evidence that international
law can be and is developed by state practice lies in the fact that in
1958, at the time of the first of recent failures of the international
community to reach agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea,
some 14 states claimed a 12-mile territorial sea, whereas by 1970
some 45 states have established a territorial sea of 12 miles or more.
Indeed, the three-mile territorial sea, now claimed by only 24 coun-
tries, was itself established by state practice.6 4
The Third Law of the Sea Conference is the first time the world
community has attempted to develop a comprehensive law of the sea
through the treaty process. The four conventions adopted by the 1958
64. Canadian Practice in International Law during 1970 as Reflected Mainly in
Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department of External Affairs, [ 197 1]
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 276, 289-90.
The customs waters of the United States are defined as four leagues (12 nautical
miles) from the coast, 19 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1970), and the customs enforcement
area is limited to no more than 50 nautical miles from the outer limit of the customs
waters (62 miles total), id. § 1709(c). The original four leagues law was enacted as
Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 11-13, 1 Stat. 145, as amended by Act of Mar. 2,
1799, ch. 22, §§ 25-26, 1 Stat. 627. The 62-nautical-mile limit, as well as the four league
definition of customs waters, is found in the Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, Pub. L. No.
238, §§ 1(a), 201, 49 Stat. 517. The 1966 legislation establishing a nine-mile con-
tiguous zone for fishing is the Bartlett Act, Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908 (1966).
The 1970 legislation extending pollution control jurisdiction to 12 miles is the Water
and Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91.
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Conference on the Law of the Sea were largely codifications of ex-
isting international law. While observing that the conference approach
is "an exercise in futility for the reason that throughout history the
origins of the conventional LOS are found primarily in customary
law," E.W. Seabrook Hull has suggested that the enactment and im-
plementation of interim legislation "could provide the responsible uni-
lateral seed from which customary international LOS traditionally
emerges. ' 65 It is anticipated that the Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act of 1976 will assist in the development of a meaningful
and functional law of the sea for many years to come.
VI. SOME CLOSING OBSERVATIONS
It has been asserted that the Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act of 1976 is a seminal example of how Congress flouts inter-
national law. I believe this statement to be not only unfair but totally
inaccurate. Great care was taken to construct a bill that was in com-
plete keeping with the developing consensus in the Law of the Sea
Conference. That that effort was successful is evidenced by unani-
mous approval of the United States law by the nations fishing off our
shores. No treaties have been broken, and an issue that has been the
spark for more than its share of confrontations has been resolved.
I suspect that few internationalists will write of the achievements
brought about by the Fishery Conservation and Management Act. But
the goal of any legal system is both order and relevance. Narrow
fishery management limits did not serve us well in the competition for
the world's fishery resources. This is a fact. But a new attempt is upon
us, and the United States now has the responsibility of making the
new system work. I firmly believe that it will handle that responsibility
successfully and that future generations will be better off because of it.
65. E.W.S. Hull, The International Law of the Sea: A Case for a Customary
Approach 1. 4 (Apr. 1976) (Occasional Paper No. 30, Law of the Sea Institute.
University of Rhode Island).
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